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Litigant Choice Between
State and Federal Courts
Victor E. Flango, Ph.D.*
Controversy over the appropriate division of jurisdiction is a necessary
consequence of the parallel court systems that exist in the United States. The
choice of fora has led to jurisdictional friction between state and federal
courts, including controversies over diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, habeas
corpus litigation, preemption and removal formulae, and state court noncom-
pliance with federal judicial orders.' The fact that state and federal courts
have interpreted and enforced each other's laws ever since the United States
was founded creates potential cooperation and conflict.' Quoting Alexander
Hamilton, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated, "National courts need not
overpower or supplant the existing state courts. . . . Instead 'the national and
State systems are to be regarded as one whole." 3 This premise assumes "that
state and federal courts are fungible and that any departure from this premise
will cast undue aspersions on the capabilities of state judges."4 Yet, federal
* Director, Court Research Department, National Center for State Courts, 300 Newport
Avenue, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185. The author wishes to thank Professor Herbert A.
Johnson for the invitation to make a presentation at the conference, thus providing the opportunity
to exchange ideas on shared jurisdiction in federal systems. Special thanks to Carol Flango for
her editing and proofing and to Pam Petrakis for formatting this document. Points of view and
opinions expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views or policies
of the National Center for State Courts.
1. See generally HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973)
[hereinafter A GENERAL VIEW]; CARL McGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES (1969); MITCHELL WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS (1949); Kenneth C. Cole, Erie v. Tompkins and the Relationship Between
Federal and State Courts, 36 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 885 (1942); Roger J. Miner, The Tensions of
a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptions for Relief, 51 ALB. L. REV. 151 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953). See
JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967) (for a discussion of the general need
for coordination); Jeffrey S. Luke, Managing Interconnectedness: The Challenge of Shared
Power, in 4 SHARED POWER 25 (John M. Bryson & Robert C. Einsweiler eds., 1991) (for the
idea that friction is an effect of efforts to interconnect); and Eric Trist, Collaboration in Work
Settings: A Personal Perspective, 13 J. OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCI. 268 (1977) (for a
discussion of potential for conflict).
3. WilliamH. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conferenceon State-FederaIJudicial
Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1658 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 494
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
4. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
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review of habeas corpus petitions from prisoners convicted in state court, the
parallel development of § 1983 prisoner petitions, and the very existence of
diversity jurisdiction are based upon the premise that state courts cannot be
fully trusted to enforce federal rights.' Indeed, with the Violence Against
Women Act and the trend toward increasing the number of federal crimes,
some would argue that the tendency is for federal courts to expand jurisdiction
at the expense of state courts.
6
Obviously, the Constitution defines broad boundaries between state and
federal courts, but litigants have much room to maneuver within these
boundaries. For example, in "one of the most politically divisive" areas of
federal jurisdiction, habeas corpus, the issue of forum shopping does not
arise.7 Habeas corpus petitions challenge the constitutionality of a person's
detention and request release. Federal courts have jurisdiction over habeas
petitions from state prisoners claiming they are held in custody in violation of
federal law. In this civil writ over a criminal matter, petitioners typically
exhaust state court remedies first and then file in federal court. Tension
between state and federal courts is exacerbated when "a single federal judge
may overturn the judgment of the highest court of a State."'  From the
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1825
(1992).
5. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988)); VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1994);
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3601-30 (2d ed. 1984
& Supp. 1994) (for an authoritative discussion of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction). In his
opening remarks to the conference, Henry J. Bourguignon, The Federal Key to the Judiciary Act
of 1789, 46 S.C. L. REV. 647 (1995), Professor Bourguignon showed that the distrust of state
courts was evident as early as 1789.
6. See WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1994); H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to
Federalize is a Road to Ruin, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1993, at 8. The Violence Against Women Act,
S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), introduced by Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) would enhance
penalties for certain sex offenses and create new federal civil rights actions for violent crimes
committed on the basis of gender. One commentator notes that past congressional action has
federalized such offenses as carjacking and theft of animals from research facilities. See
Christopher Zimmerman, The New Crime Bill, 20 ST. LEGISLATURES 27 (1994). The Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 would expand the scope of federal criminal
law by "federalizing" state crimes, e.g., possession of handguns by juveniles, theft of art works,
and interstate domestic violence. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
7. SUBCOMM. ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE
STATES, REPORT TO FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 468 (1990). The Committee was
authorized by the 100th Congress as part of the 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-09, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644-45.
8. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1981); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 263-64 (1973) (quoting Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Paul C.
Reardon on the "humiliation of review from the full bench of the highest State appellate court to
2
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litigant's perspective, however, this is the ultimate in forum shopping, because
petitioners can use state and federal courts.
Perhaps, a more basic question is: To what extent should the wishes of
litigants influence the allocation of disputes between federal and state courts?9
Some might argue that the desires of litigants should be irrelevant to the forum
allocation issue because the primary responsibility of the court is to develop
the law.' 0 On the other hand, the free market argument is that litigants
should take advantage of the options provided." But what forum is chosen
if litigants disagree? Further, why should a federal court alternative be
available to some state law claimants and not to others? 2 This Article will
explore some key factors that influence litigants' decisions to use the state or
federal courts in an area of law in which choice of forum is possible-federal
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction.
Diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction is an interesting arena from which to
observe the state-federal relationship because diversity cases require federal
courts to apply state law, not federal law, in deciding cases. 3 Opponents of
diversity jurisdiction contend that federal courts are not the best interpreters
of state law and that federal courts time could be better used deciding federal
cases. " The argument concludes simply that state cases belong in state
courts.
The controversy over diversity jurisdiction is not new. Indeed, it has
existed since diversity jurisdiction was conferred upon federal courts by the
Judiciary Act of 1789.1 Even the attempt to minimize friction between state
a single United States District Court judge").
9. See Redish, supra note 4, at 1775.
10. Id. Professor Peter Nygh, in his paper Choice of Law Rules and Forum Shopping in
Australia, 46 S.C. L. REv. 897 (1995), shows that a plaintiff's preference is not a relevant
consideration in Australia.
11. In his paper, Federal Jurisdiction in Australian Courts: Policies and Prospects, 46 S.C.
L. REv. 765 (1995), Professor Brian Opeskin asks why concurrent jurisdiction is conferred if
forum shopping is to be discouraged.
12. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim
& Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Shawn R. McCarver, Note, The
"Probate Exception" to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Matters Related to Probate, 48 Mo. L.
REv. 564 (1983); Denise Micklus-Nicotra, Note, Federal Courts-The Continued Vitality and
Questionable Validity of the Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 56 TEMP.
L.Q. 228 (1983); Anthony B. Ullman, Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity
Jurisdiction, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1824 (1983).
13. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78-80 (1938); See generally AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE. STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
99-161 (1969); Howard C. Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea Whose Time hasPassed, 51
IND. L.J. 347 (1976).
14. Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483
(1928); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 99.
15. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78; Russell Chapin, Federal or State
1995]
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and federal courts results in complex procedural problems. One attorney
observed that "[t]he law books are filled with cases involving devices by which
some parties seek to create diversity of citizenship and get into the federal
courts, and with the comparable efforts of others to prevent diversity and keep
cases in the state courts." 6 By highlighting the primary reasons litigants and
their attorneys choose to file cases in state or federal court, when a choice is
available, this controversy can illuminate the general considerations involved
in choice of forum.'
Attorneys' perceptions of the comparative quality of justice received in
state and federal courts might affect forum choice regardless of the factual
accuracy of their perceptions. Accordingly, the author conducted a survey to
identify attorneys' attitudes toward choice of forum. 8 Of the various reasons
attorneys give for choosing one forum over the other, three stood out: bias
against outsiders, comparative quality ofjudges, and familiarity with processes
and procedures of one or the other court system.
Protection for out-of-state litigants has been cited as the basic reason for
retaining diversity jurisdiction in federal courts. '9 In Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
Court: ShouldDiversity Jurisdiction Be Abolished?, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE, Spring
1989, at 29 (noting that diversity jurisdiction was "tepidly supported and vigorously opposed
during the debates over the ratification of the United States Constitution"). Roscoe Pound, in a
speech to the American Bar Association, described diversity as "archaic" and renewed the debate
over diversity jurisdiction. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, Address Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 26, 1906), in 35
F.R.D. 273, 286 (1964). See also PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 17-18 (3d ed. 1988); James W. Moore & Donald
T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1964);
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49 (1923).
16. Chapin, supra note 15, at 31.
17. Note that this article focuses on litigant choice between state and federal court, not the
impact of changingjurisdictions on the caseloads of either state or federal court. For information
on the latter subject, see Victor E. Flango & B. Darren Bums, The Effect of Recent Changes in
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction on the State Courts, ST. CT. J., Spring 1989, at 4, and Victor E.
Flango, How Would the Abolition of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Affect State Courts?, 74
JUDICATURE 35 (1990). For some, the principal reason for eliminating or curtailing diversity
jurisdiction is to reduce the federal courts' caseload. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 651 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("An Act for the elimination
of diversity jurisdiction could fairly be called an Act for the relief of the federal courts.");
Charles L. Brieant, Diversity Jurisdiction: Why Does the Bar Talk One Way but Vote the Other
Way with Its Feet?, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1989, at 20 (recognizing the problem of a heavy federal
caseload but arguing that diversity jurisdiction should be retained); Douglas D. McFarland,
Diversity Jurisdiction: Is Local Prejudice Feared?, LrrtG., Fall 1980, at 38 (listing federal
caseloads as the "first and foremost reason" for abolishing diversity jurisdiction).
18. The complete results of this analysis are reported in Victor E. Flango, Attorneys'
Perspectives on Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 25 AKRON L. REV. 41 (1991) [hereinafter
Perspectives].
19. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Marshall,
4
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kinsi ° the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that "[d]iversity of citizenship
jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in
state courts against those not citizens of the state."21 A major study of
federal jurisdiction undertaken by the American Law Institute at the request
of Chief Justice Earl Warren concluded that diversity jurisdiction should be
retained only if prejudice against out-of-state citizens continued to be a factor
in litigation. 2
Opponents of diversity jurisdiction argue that bias against out-of-state
citizens is no longer important.23 Professor Rosenberg contends that many
"hard-working judges and thoughtful academics believe those fears of
hometown favoritism are not really a problem today.'24
Advocates for retaining diversity jurisdiction might agree that bias against
out-of-state citizens is less of a problem, but "anyone who believes that there
is no local chauvinism in the state courts is hiding his head somewhere."'
One attorney concedes that Professor Rosenberg's assurance of no hometown
favoritism could be true for metropolitan areas, but this "is not the reality for
most attorneys in most parts of the country."26 The Federal Courts Study
Committee, appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, acknowledged that local
bias "may be a problem in some jurisdictions" but not sufficiently so to be a
"compelling justification" for retaining diversity jurisdiction in federal
courts. 2 7
Empirical evidence on the influence of fear of prejudice on lawyers'
choice of forum has been mixed. One survey of 163 Virginia lawyers found
that 60 percent of the respondents representing out-of-state plaintiffs cited
C.J.) (stating that the Constitution "entertains apprehensions" that the local courts are biased in
favor of local citizens); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945)
("Diversity jurisdiction is founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from
susceptibility to potential local bias."); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883) (stating that
diversity jurisdiction was established "to institute independent tribunals, which . . would be
unaffected by local prejudices"); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial
States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 278 (1992)
(noting that diversity jurisdiction was "created because of the fear that state courts might prefer
local litigants").
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. Id. at 74; see also Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 521 (1928).
22. AMERIcAN LAw INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 105.
23. See A GENERAL VIEW, supra note 1, at 147-49.
24. Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Columbia University School of Law, quoted in Coyle,
Time to Kill Diversity Jurisdiction, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 40.
25. Brieant, supra note 17, at 21.
26. Robert Dames, Jr., Diversity Is for Litigants, Not Courts or Judges, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
4, 1988, at 12.
27. SUBCOMM. ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE
STATES, supra note 7, at 38.
1995]
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potential prejudice as a reason for their choice of federal court over state
court.28 Similarly, in another survey of seventy-four lawyers representing
out-of-state clients in federal cases, 40 percent reported that fear of local bias
was a consideration in their choice of forum.2 9 However, only 4.3 percent
of eighty-two Wisconsin lawyers cited "local bias against nonresident client"
as a factor in their choice of forum." Bumiller found that fear of bias
against out-of-state clients influenced the decision to use federal courts in
South Carolina but that it was not a significant consideration in Los Angeles
and Philadelphia.3 '
This research found that 60 percent of all respondents and 72 percent of
the respondents drawn from the federal sample of cases consider the resident
status of their clients as a relevant factor in choice of forum. 2 Attorneys
representing nonresidents overwhelmingly prefer to file in federal court (85
percent of the attorneys identified from a sample of state court cases and 96
percent of the attorneys identified from a sample of federal court cases filed
in U.S. district court).33 Conversely, if the opposing client is not a state
resident, most attorneys (70 percent in the state sample and 63 percent in the
federal sample) who consider resident status to be important prefer to file in
state courts.
3 4
Analysis of the survey revealed that local bias was not a single consider-
ation affecting forum choice but was one of a combination of attitudes toward
nonresidents of a state and attitudes toward corporations.35 Of the attorneys
selected from cases filed in state court, 63 percent considered the nonresidency
of their clients to be an important factor in forum choice. Of the attorneys
selected from cases filed in federal court, an even higher percentage (71
percent) considered nonresidency to be a significant factor in forum selection.
As an aside to this discussion, fear of bias might not be confined to out-
of-state residents. Bumiller observed that in rural areas attorneys are more
likely to "prefer federal courts to protect their clients from perceived local bias
and poorer quality of judges."36 One attorney from the Dallas sample
28. Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51
VA. L. REv. 178, 179-82 (1965).
29. Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A
Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 97-99 (1980).
30. Marvin R. Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity
Cases, 47 IOWA L. REV. 933, 937-39 (1962).
31. Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and
Implications for Reform, 15 L. & Soc'v Rav. 749, 759-60 (1980-81).
32. Perspectives, supra note 18, at 23.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 16.
36. Bumiller, supra note 31, at 752.
(Vol. 46:961
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commented, "State court judges are very biased against nonlocal attorneys and
parties, particularly in the smaller, rural counties.""' Miller's research on
diversity cases and federal question cases removed from state court to federal
court indicates that bias against nonlocals is perceived to be much less than
bias against out-of-state residents. 8 Moreover, Miller noted a geographic
component to the bias, with defense attorneys in the Northeast, industrialized
Midwest, and West reporting lower levels of bias against out-of-state litigants
than attorneys in the South and less industrialized Midwest. 9 Further
research is needed to compare local bias between rural and urban areas within
states with bias based upon state of residency.
The original intent behind diversity jurisdiction was to promote interstate
commerce by ensuring commercial cases would be heard in an impartial forum
to protect foreign litigants from local bias.40 Frank lists concern over local
prejudice against commercial litigants as one of the primary motivations for
the creation of diversity jurisdiction.4
Friendly has suggested that apparent bias against out-of-state residents
results from prejudices that are less related to residency than to litigant status,
such as prejudice against large corporations.42 Bumiller isolated anticorpor-
ate sentiment from local bias as separate influences on choice of forum and
concluded that out-of-state plaintiffs were expressing a preference for federal
court justice.43
In his study of cases removed from state court to federal court, Neal
Miller reported that 26 percent of plaintiff attorneys and 51 percent of the
defense attorneys in his sample reported bias against out-of-state litigants."
The comparable figures for bias against corporations were 18 percent and 45
percent, respectively.4'
This research showed that 37 percent of the attorneys in the state sample
and 41 percent of the attorneys in the federal sample considered the corporate
status of their client as an important consideration in forum choice.46 A
smaller percentage (36 percent of the state sample and 29 percent of the
federal sample) considered the corporate status of their opponent as a factor
37. Perspectives, supra note 18, at 24.
38. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 409 (1992).
39. Id. at 410.
40. Brieant, supra note 17, at 20.
41. John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 28 (1948).
42. See A GENERAL VIEW, supra note 1, at 147-48.
43. Bumiller, supra note 31, at 773.
44. Miller, supra note 38, at 409.
45. Id.
46. Perspectives, supra note 18, at 27.
1995]
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TABLE 1
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF RESIDENCY STATUS AND CORPORATE STATUS
FEDERAL/
STATE FEDERAL STATE
SAMPLE SAMPLE SAMPLE TOTAL
Both residency status, cporate 31% 38% 30% 34%
status important (254) (209) (56) (519)
Residency status important; 31% 33% 23% 31%
Corporate status not important (253) (178) (52) (483)
Corporate status important; 5% 3% 6% 4%
Residency status not important (43) (14) (52) (69)
Neither residency status nor 32% 27% 36% 31 Y
corporate status important (257) (146) (67) (470)
[TOTAL 807 547 187 11,541
in forum choice. Attorneys who do regard corporate status as an important
consideration in forum selection tend to favor federal court if their client is a
corporation and state court if their opponent is a corporation. One Texas
attorney noted that "federal judges are mainly Reagan appointees very
conservative and willing to violate the law to help establishment-type
defendants. "
Table 1 compares attorney perception of the comparative importance of
resident and corporate status.
About one-third of the attorneys surveyed consider residency status and
corporate status when selecting a forum for litigation, another one-third say
neither is important, and the remainder consider residency more important than
corporate status in choosing a forum. In other words, twice as many attorneys
feared bias based upon out-of-state residency status as feared bias based upon
the corporate status of their clients. The majority of those who consider state
residency status and corporate status important prefer federal court, as do
approximately two-thirds of the attorneys who considered state residency, but
not corporate status, to be an important consideration in forum selection.
The rules for determining state citizenship are complex. In general, an
individual is a citizen of the state of domicile, and a corporation is a citizen
of any state in which it is incorporated or has its principal place of busi-
ness. 4 Insurance companies are citizens of the state of domicile of the
47. Victor E. Flango, Why Do Attorneys Prefer State Courts or Federal Courts?, ST. CT. I.,
Fall 1991, at 16, 17.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988).
[Vol. 46:961
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person insured.4 9 A plaintiff can invoke diversity jurisdiction if the suit is
between citizens of different states and the amount-in-controversy exceeds
$50,000. Under the same circumstances, an out-of-state defendant, but not an
in-state defendant, can remove the case from state to federal court.5
Diversity must be complete, i.e., diversity jurisdiction is not available if any
one defendant and any one plaintiff are citizens of the same state.5' A
plaintiff may therefore prevent a case from going to federal district court by
including as a party a defendant from his own state. Indeed, lawyers also have
ways of creating diversity jurisdiction if necessary.
5 2
Using 1987 data provided by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, the author found that the proportion of in-state individual
plaintiffs filing in federal court against out-of-state residents was unexpectedly
large.53 Expectations of favorable treatment should lead in-state plaintiffs to
file in state court, and fear of local bias should lead out-of-state plaintiffs to
file in federal court. Theoretically, the classic situation in which local bias
works together with anticorporate bias is when an in-state plaintiff sues an out-
of state corporation. In the words of one attorney, "[W]hen representing a
local individual against [an] out-of-state corporation, the judge presiding who
is an elected official has a natural, inherent bias for the local voter.""
Contrary to those expectations, many in-state plaintiffs chose to file suit
against out-of-state corporations in federal court, not in state court in which
they presumably would have an advantage. The data further showed that in-
state plaintiffs remove to federal court as often as out-of-state defendants
do. 55
Using data for the fiscal year ending September 1993,6 Table 2 shows
that half of the 51,445 diversity cases filed in U.S. District Courts involved
in-state individual plaintiffs and another 10 percent involved in-state corpora-
tions. Most suits (82 percent) by out-of-state corporations in federal courts
involved in-state individuals or corporations. Few involved foreign citizens
or nations. One-third of the suits involved a conflict between an in-state
individual plaintiff and an out-of-state business. But Table 2 provides only
49. Id.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
51. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (establishing rule of
complete diversity).
52. David A. Skidmore, Jr., Making a Federal Case Out of It: Creating Diversity
Jurisdiction, 40 FED. B. NEws & J. 390 (1993).
53. Victor E. Flango & Craig Boersema, Changes in Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Effects
on State Court Caseloads, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 405, 446 (1990).
54. Flango, supra note 47, at 17.
55. Flango & Boersema, Changes in Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 446.
56. The author is grateful to Dr. William. T. Rule, Economist in the Long Range Planning
Office of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, for providing this data.
19951
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TABLE 2: TOTAL DIVERSITY FILINGS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT
FY 1993 BY PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
Defen-
dants
Plaintiffs In-State Out-of- Foreign In-State Out-of- Foreign Total
Indiv. State Indiv. Business State Nation
Indiv. Business
In-State 117* 5,634 1,675 933 17,504 179 26,042
Individual
Out-of- 3,607 760 230 2,055 6,377 31 13,060
State
Individual
Foreign 523 151 50 361 178 4 1,267
Individual
In-State 271 980 284 82* 3,730 61 5,408
Business
Out-of- 2,766 251 48 2,189 773 25 6,052
State
Business
Foreign 30 3 1 53 14 3 104
Nation
TOTAL 7,314 7,779 2,288 5,673 28,576 303 51,933
*If both parties are state residents, diversity jurisdiction cannot be invoked.
These cases may have been miscoded.
10
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TABLE 3: ORIGINAL DIVERSITY FILINGS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT
FY 1993 BY PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
Defen-
dants
In-State Out-of- Foreign In-State Out-of- Foreign Total
Indiv. State Indiv. Business State Nation
Indiv. Business
Plaintiffs
In-State 77 3,285 1,107 603 7,832 99 13,003
Individual
Out-of- 3,140 506 164 1,684 2,152 14 7,660
State
Individual
Foreign 463 121 29 311 119 4 1,047
Individual
In-State 230 739 209 52 2,197 43 3,470
Business
Out-of- 2,467 186 35 1,912 503 18 5,121
State
Business
Foreign 30 1 1 50 14 2 989
Nation
TOTAL 6,407 4,838 1,545 4,612 12,817 180 30,399
part of the story. Without knowing how these cases got to federal court, it is
not possible to draw any firm conclusions.
Of the total diversity caseload, 28 percent (14,470 cases) were originally
filed in state court then removed to federal court. Not surprisingly, out-of-
state businesses accounted for 73 percent (10,608) of the removals (of cases
involving 8,439 in-state individuals and 1,324 in-state businesses.) More
surprising was the distribution of 30,399 cases originally filed in U.S. District
Court (Table 3). Of these, 43 percent were filed by in-state individuals and
11 percent by in-state businesses. In other words, more cases were filed in
federal court by in-state residents (16,473) than by out-of-state residents
(12,781). Moreover, in most of the cases filed by in-state residents, the
defendant was an out-of-state corporation.
The large number of filings by in-state individual plaintiffs filed in federal
court was unexpected, given the supposed advantages of confronting an out-of-
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state defendant and an out-of-state corporate defendant in the local, "friendly"
state court.
Concern about the quality of justice in state courts might be another
aspect of the concern over local bias. Miller notes that the rationale for
diversity jurisdiction might be a "reflection of the lesser quality of state court
judges and their inability to protect against the effects of local bias. "I
Whether or not an aspect of bias, one reason for concurrent federal and state
court jurisdiction is a concern about the quality of justice received in state
courts.5" One West Virginia attorney who expressed a preference for federal
courts in cases involving complex legal issues commented, "In state court,
there was little chance of getting a judge capable of understanding the issue or
willing to work hard enough to do so. The federal judges are simply brighter
and more conscientious." 59 A Texas lawyer noted that "federal judges do not
receive campaign contributions from lawyers who practice in front of
[them]. "I Bumiller found that preference for the perceived higher quality
of federal judges was an important factor in choice of forum in each district
but especially in the two more rural districts. 6'
Others argue that state courts have been improving to the point where "it
is not clear that on a nationwide basis, federal courts are consistently superior
to, or more current than, state courts.'62 Moreover, state courts vary among
themselves in terms of quality of justice, so it is naive to compare federal
courts to state courts as if there were only two court systems instead of fifty-
two.
Nearly half of all respondents to the survey reported no difference
between state and federal judges in terms of sympathy to local litigants.63
The survey found that 55 percent of the attorneys from the state sample and
57. Miller, supra note 38, at 374.
58. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 144 (1985)
(arguing that the quality of justice is better in federal courts because they have more qualified
judges, less congestion, and better rules of procedure); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HA.v. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (asserting that federal judges are more technically competent than
state judges and are more insulated from public pressure, permitting them to make more
controversial decisions); see also John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 403, 410 (1979); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and
a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REv. 317, 328-29 (1977); Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin,
Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 869, 870 (1931).
59. Perspectives, supra note 18, at 29.
60. Flango, supra note 47.
61. Bumiller, supra note 31, at 768-69.
62. Wilfred Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction an Idea Whose Time Has Passed?, 61 N.Y.
ST. B.J., July 1989, at 14, 18; see also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional
Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983) (exploring the issue of the institutionalcompetence of state trial courts).
63. Perspectives, supra note 18, at 29.
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79 percent of the attorneys from the federal sample regarded overall
competence of the judiciary and quality of judges as reasons for choosing
federal court.'
Bumiller found that familiarity with judges and with rules of procedure
were relevant to forum selection.' Many plaintiffs' attorneys in Miller's
study did not find federal courts "user friendly."' This research found that
most attorneys did not choose the forum based upon geographical convenience,
but 60 percent of the attorneys in the state sample gave familiarity with court
operations as a reason for choosing state courts. An attorney from Sacramento
summarized that "State courts are more 'caring' (closer to litigants and
attorneys); federal courts tend to be more aloof, distant."67 When asked to
evaluate factors most important to forum selection other than jurisdictional
requirements, attorneys who tended to practice in state courts listed familiarity
with court operations, convenience, lower filing fees, and availability of
arbitration. These lawyers considered state courts "attorney friendly" and
state judges more accessible.
The research also lends some support to Bumiller's stratification of
attorneys into a "state" and a "federal" bar.6" There are indeed differences
between lawyers who usually litigate in state courts, and lawyers who usually
litigate in federal courts. Solo practitioners and attorneys from smaller law
firms more often prefer state courts.
What considerations lead litigants and their attorneys to choose state court
or federal court when a choice is available? Based upon responses from a
survey of attorneys who litigate in state and federal courts, this author
concluded that quality of judges, residence and status of litigant, and
familiarity with local or federal courts were the three primary reasons
attorneys gave for choosing federal or state courts. More specifically,
attorneys prefer to file in state courts if their opponent is not a state resident
and if they are accustomed to working with state courts and their less onerous
pretrial requirements. Lower costs to litigants and voir dire procedures also
favor use of state courts.
Attorneys who usually practice before federal courts tend to be from
larger law firms and tend to view federal judges as better trained, better
supported with resources, and more impartial because they are not elected.
They believe complex litigation belongs in federal court. Specifically,
attorneys prefer federal courts if their client is from out of state and if they
believe that the competence of the judiciary in general and the quality of judge
64. Id.
65. Bumiller, supra note 31, at 755-58.
66. Miller, supra note 38, at 446.
67. Perspectives, supra note 18, at 38.
68. Bumiller, supra note 31, at 772.
1995]
13
Flango: Litigant Choice Between State and Federal Courts
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
is important to their case. Attorneys who prefer greater judicial pretrial
involvement also favor federal court.
The quality of state courts and judges varies from state to state and within
each state over time. Indeed, case processing time and the influence of
litigation costs were important to the choice of forum in some places but not
in others. Overall, however, federal judges might be perceived as more
qualified because:
" There are fewer federal judges, so they have more prestige and status.
For this reason, the Judicial Conference of the United States, while
eschewing caps, has taken a position "that judicial growth should be
carefully controlled."'69
" Federal judges have life tenure, one of the key components of judicial
independence.
" Federal judges are less subject to local political pressures since they
are appointed rather than elected.
" Federal judges have the more traditional trial role because they do not
have the high-volume caseloads of state courts, nor do they handle
domestic matters. Magistrate judges handle habeas corpus petitions
and other high-volume matters.
" Federal judges have smaller, more homogeneous caseloads with more
time to contemplate and much larger support staffs and facilities
including libraries.
As currently written, diversity jurisdiction permits litigants some
flexibility in choice of forum. Indeed, it may be that some individuals favor
retention of diversity jurisdiction merely to preserve the choice of state court
or federal court. In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, John
Frank noted:
I am not here preaching the cult of the superman, arguing that all
federal judges are abler than all state judges, or even that most of them
are. I say only that many thousands of Americans believed that they
would be better off in federal court than in the state court .... The point
is that for more than two centuries, those people and their ancestors before
them have been entitled to make that choice. They should not be deprived
of that option now.70
69. Henry J. Reske, Keeping a Trim Federal Judiciary, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, at 26.
70. Revising FederalJurisdictionalRules: Hearings on H.R. 4357 Before the Subcomm. on
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Kastenmeier and Remington summarized more succinctly, "Basically, the
bar likes forum shopping.""
If attorneys and their clients prefer federal courts, there are ways of
"creating" diversity jurisdiction.7' To counter the expansion of federal
diversity jurisdiction, Congress is considering several proposals to restrict
choice of forum. A Federal Courts Study Committee, appointed by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist to prepare a long-range plan for the federal
judiciary, recommended that "Congress should limit federal jurisdiction based
on diversity of citizenship to complex multi-state litigation, interpleader, and
suits involving aliens."73 The Study Committee further recommended that
if Congress decided not to eliminate diversity jurisdiction, it should:
" prohibit plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home
states. The only colorable argument supporting diversity jurisdic-
tion-fear of state court bias against out-of-state litigants-has no
force when in-state plaintiffs invoke it.
" deem corporations to be citizens of every state in which they are
licensed to do business. The same reason that justifies barring
diversity jurisdiction to in-state plaintiffs justifies prohibiting diversity
jurisdiction for corporations in places where they-are licensed to do
business.
* specify that the jurisdictional floor does not include noneconomic
damages, such as pain and suffering, punitive damages, mental
anguish, and attorneys' fees, which litigants use to skirt the jurisdic-
tional minimum.
* raise the jurisdictional minimum from $50,000 to $75,000 and index
the new floor amount.7 4
Obviously, the elimination of diversity jurisdiction, except for interplead-
er, multi-state litigation, and suits involving aliens, would have the most
impact on litigant choice.
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of John P. Frank, appearing for the Arizona state bar).
71. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice:
A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 313 (1979).
72. Skidmore, supra note 52, at 390.
73. SUBCOMM. ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE
STATES, supra note 7, at 38.
74. Id. at 42.
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Congress recently raised the dollar limits on diversity jurisdiction so that
a case in controversy must be worth more than $50,000 before it can be heard
in federal court.' Raising the amount-in-controversy requirement further
would have the least effect on litigant choice, because the dollar amounts
demanded are often arbitrary and can be increased to meet jurisdictional
requirements.76 A suit can be dismissed if there is evidence that an attorney
increased the amount of a plaintiffs claim simply to get the suit into federal
court. 7 Even raising the jurisdictional limit to $100,000 would eliminate
only about 8 percent of the diversity cases from federal court.78
The proposals to bar plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their
home states or to deem corporations citizens of every state in which they are
licensed to do business obviously would deny a choice to those types of
litigants. Another proposal receiving attention is the one to bar in-state
individuals or corporations from claiming diversity jurisdiction. Pending bills
in the House of Representatives would, in the words of Judge Stanley Marcus
(S.D. Fla.), chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on Federal-State
Jurisdiction, "correct a long-standing anomaly in the jurisdiction of the federal
courts."" Judge Marcus argued that in 1789 Congress had a reason for
providing access to federal courts by in-state plaintiffs but not in-state
defendants because of the perceived state court prejudice against creditors.8 0
In brief, state courts were seen as favoring two distinct classes of litigants:
home-state citizens and anyone resisting the payment of debt. Judge Marcus
notes that no one is arguing that state courts are systematically biased in favor
of defendants in the adjudication of state law claims or that state courts are
under-enforcing state-created rights.8 '
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988); see also Thomas E. Baker, The History and Tradition of the
Amount in Controversy Requirement: A Proposalto "Up the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102
F.R.D. 299, 302 (1984).
76. Anthony Partridge, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION 14 (1988); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute
(Part I1), 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 268, 295 (1969).
77. See Arnold v. Troccoli, 344 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1965).
78. Flango & Boersema, supra note 53, at 434.
79. Revising Federal JurisdictionalRules: Hearings on H.R. 4446 Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Stanley Marcus, Chairman, Judicial Conference Comm. on
Federal-State Jurisdiction). H.R. 4446, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), would amend 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Proposed new subsection (e) would preclude plaintiffs from invoking diversity
jurisdiction if all plaintiffs in the suit were citizens of the state in which the suit was filed. H.R.
4357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) would go further by stating that diversity jurisdiction would
not be allowed if any plaintiff were a citizen of that state. The Judicial Conference supports H.R.
4357. Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, supra.
80. Id. Judge Marcus noted the special concern with "impairment of credit markets by
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The recent Federal Courts Study Committee recommendation cited above
echoes the conclusions of the American Law Institute study that "[tjhe in-stater
can hardly be heard to ask the federal government to spare him from litigation
in the courts of his own state." 82  Yet this research has shown that more
diversity cases are filed originally in federal courts by in-state plaintiffs than
by out-of-state residents. Accepting these recommendations would mean that
plaintiffs would be precluded from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their
home state, in the state of their principal place of business, or in any state in
which they are registered to do business.83
A variation in the proposal to bar suits by in-state plaintiffs is to consider
corporations to be citizens of every state in which they are licensed to do
business. Under present law, a corporation is treated as a citizen of any state
in which it is incorporated as well as the state in which it has its principal
place of business." This gives multistate corporations a choice of forum that
local businesses do not have.85
In whichever manner jurisdiction between state and federal courts is
divided, the process is one of experimentation and incremental change moreso
than a division based upon strict logic. This pragmatic process is marked by
"complexity and fuzziness" that might even be "desirable in giving room for
flexibility, fine-tuning, recognition of difference, and accommodation of
unforeseen developments."86
82. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 124.
83. Charles W. Joiner, Corporations as Citizens of Every State Where They Do Business: A
Needed Change in Diversity Jurisdiction, 70 JUDICATURE 291, 291-92 (1987).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988); see also David W. Jackson, Note, Federal Court
Diversity Jurisdiction and the Corporation, 8 TULSA L.J. 120 (1972).
85. Joiner, supra note 83, at 291.
86. David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the Allocation ofJurisdiction Between State andFederal
Courts: A Response to "Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts," 78 VA. L. REv. 1839, 1841 (1992).
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